Introduction
Perhaps the greatest challenge to our theories and methods is posed by rare and unexpected events. Political revolutions represent a classic example-social scientists have an abysmal track record of predicting revolutions across the globe (Kuran, 1991) . Failures of this kind are rarely acknowledged and are, as a norm, disguised by post-hoc accounts downplaying the role of surprise and chance. The collapse of communism is a case in point-while few saw it coming, it seems deceivingly predictable in hindsight. In reality, the cascade of regime resistance within (Lohmann, 1994) and across (Wejnert, 2005) countries that helped muster collective support and turn the tide against communist elites, was remarkably difficult to see in advance (Kuran, 1991 (Kuran, , 1995 .
What makes events of such kind so difficult to predict is their complexity. Complex systems are high-dimensional, non-linear, and hard to model (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000) . The more a process approximates a complex system, the more difficult it is to predict the course it runs. In other words, unpredictability is commensurate with non-linearity, heterogeneity, and ambiguity. Thus, to define an event as unpredictable is to say that it is too complex to have been produced by a combination of the pre-existing conditions that conforms to a relatively straightforward, linear logic of interdependence.
Non-linearity surfaces most visibly in sudden change, when the nature of linkages changes profoundly in a short time-such 'inflection' points create discontinuity with the past. However, these inflection points are extraordinarily difficult to identify and validate. Proving the unpredictable or discontinuous nature of events-that their endpoint is impossible to see from the beginning-is a tall order, because of the opacity of non-linearity and the methodological difficulties of establishing the precise point where the linking logic changes. Complexity studies have contributed significantly to understanding the intricacies of non-linearity, reflected in a family of processes, such as bandwagons, cascades, and contagion (for a review see Macy and Willer, 2002 ). Yet outside the realm of simulations, in which much of this research is anchored, the challenge of identification, validation, and explanation of discontinuous change and inflection points remains stubbornly acute.
The price to pay for failing to address this challenge is 'overcausation'-the exaggeration of links between perceived causes and effects. Applied to rare, unusual events that lack a robust historical trail, 'overcausation' is tantamount to seeing considerably more logic and order than merited. In this article the perils of 'overcausation' are illustrated by way of an event that was largely interpreted at the time of occurrence as surprising, but predictable. In contrast, the analysis reveals a level of complexity sufficiently high to render the event unpredictable. While there were important preconditions for its occurrence, the way in which these coalesced was neither straightforward nor planned.
The main contribution of the article is in identifying and generalizing a substantive reason for unpredictability, defined as 'sudden convergence'-the spontaneous correlation between components or preferences that were heretofore unrelated. It is suggested that underlying many surprises and prediction failures is the abrupt, uncoordinated realignment of pre-existing differences. What makes this process noteworthy from a sociological perspective is its unwieldiness to reasoning of historical continuity and path dependence. 'Sudden convergence' is a mechanism of discontinuous change that highlights one of the convoluted trajectories whereby historical rupture occurs.
To illustrate this principle, we examine the rise of 'Ataka', a nationalist-populist Bulgarian party that, barely 2 months after its creation, attained nearly 9 per cent of the vote in the 25 June 2005 parliamentary elections. The fact that an obscure formation with meagre resources attracted in a few weeks nearly 300,000 votes jolted the political system to its core. This case is well suited to studying unpredictability because the surprising nature of the event is largely undisputed.
1 In fact, the rise of 'Ataka' was so sudden that the party just managed to meet the registration deadline for the elections.
Both direct and indirect data are used in the analysis. These include a survey administered shortly after the elections and data on Internet searches and newspaper coverage for the period right before the elections. The analyses suggest that the unexpected rise of 'Ataka' as a force to reckon with was due to sudden, unscripted convergence of diverse preferences. Aided by ambiguity over the true nature of a political upstart, 'Ataka' attracted an unusually heterogeneous set of voters, which hitched idiosyncratic grievances onto a bandwagon, linking groups with little in common except for discontent with the present. However, unlike a mere case of political brokerage, the event was difficult to foresee because the workings of brokerage were spontaneous and convergent rather than strategically enacted.
Theory
To reproduce history, we have three types of modelsdynamically indeterminate, determinate and linear, and determinate and non-linear (Reisch, 1991) . The first one-dynamical indeterminism-has a strong and weak form. The strong form denies that history is fuelled by dynamical forces or causes at all, seeing each historical slice as unconstrained by the prior one in time. Explanations here are mere chronicles of events. In the weak form, the slices of history are probabilistically determined by their antecedents. The future is predictable on the basis of past states in a probabilistic manner from among a range of future possibilities available at the time. But whatever course history takes, we know little about why things turned out exactly the way that they did. In contrast, deterministic and linear models allow us to specify exact causes of events. There, effects are linearly proportional to causes-for example, increasing inefficiencies in the communist mode of production lead to higher probability of regime contestation and change. Minor chance perturbations to the system are of limited significance and can be safely subsumed within the error term of the regression equation.
Random occurrences are much more consequential in non-linear deterministic models where small causes have disproportionately large effects. The appeal of non-linear models lies in their ability to capture both the surprising nature of events and their anchoring in historical sequences. To establish the logic by which an event occurs, it is not enough to match a set of features of the event to the initial conditions because it is not the initial conditions per se, but their aggregation that produces the event. The logic that generates the outcome is interactive, contextual, nonlinear and irreducible to the initial conditions (Axelrod and Cohen, 2000) .
One prominent manifestation of this logic is the concept of 'emergence' in complexity research-the aggregation of discrete elements into a whole that amounts to more than the sum of the constitutive elements. In a process of path-dependent selforganization, the initial conditions constrain and motivate the behaviour of actors, whose interactions aggregate as new outcomes (Macy and Willer, 2002, pp. 147-148) . Thereby, simple rules of local interaction give rise to highly intricate and enigmatic global patterns, such as revolutions or fads. An example is neighbourhood flight, when a minor rise in the proportion of residents from one group precipitates the departure of other groups (Schelling, 1978) . Thus, in systems with high sensitivity to small perturbations and subtle change, surprises are a natural occurrence. Of course, many events do not follow a pattern of bottom-up aggregation and are better understood as a product of coordination of some kind, but in thinking about surprises a proper starting point is the assumption that they reflect complex, non-linear combinations of pre-existing elements.
This assumption is in agreement with a research tradition emphasizing the ambiguous and contradictory nature of historical events, seeing ambiguity and heterogeneity rather than planning and self-interest, as the raw materials of which historical facts are constructed (Padgett and Ansell, 1993, p. 1259) . In this perspective, unpredictability is a correlate of ambiguity and heterogeneity, resulting from complex combinations of diverse historical artefacts, such as interests, networks, and grievances. Two logics of combination have received particular attention in past research-'bricolage' or the strategic use of ambiguity (Stark, 1996) and 'robust action' or the gradual aggregation of local action and identities over time (Padgett and Ansell, 1993) .
The process of 'bricolage' or recombination, described by Stark (1996) in the post-communist context, stands for the blurring of boundaries in networks of interlocked ownership, engineered by actors who manoeuvre across justificatory principles and strategically exploit ambiguities (Stark, 1996, p. 995) . Post-communism features a panoply of organizing principles, which are selectively applied, transposed, and combined in pursuit of profit. The logic of 'bricolage' is that of strategic orchestration of heterogeneous assets into hybrid organizational forms.
2 Another kind of combinatory logic was highlighted by Padgett and Ansell (1993) in their analysis of Medici-dominated Florence. The Medici party was a heterogeneous mixture of contradictory interests and cross-cutting networks that congealed in the absence of direct oversight. Cosimo de Medici capitalized reactively on political and economic forces far beyond his control. The main reason for his success was the lack of goal-oriented sequences of strategic play that might be predictable and therefore, contestable (Padgett and Ansell, 1993, p. 1264) .
While both emphasize ambiguity and heterogeneity, these logics chart different trajectories of unpredictability. In one case, it is due to interacting individual strategies of opportunity hoarding, while in the other, to latent, spontaneous constellation of heterogeneous interests. Both processes are accompanied by uncertainty over the endpoint, leaving ample room for accidental developments. Another common trait is the long-term temporal perspective-in both cases the combinatory process unfolds over years or decades. In trying to understand sudden, unexpected occurrences, such as the collapse of socialism, a long-term perspective is useful in clarifying the structural preconditions, but not the abrupt, disruptive manner in which it occurred. How can we describe such events in a way that builds on existing accounts, but compresses the time horizon sufficiently to explain their suddenness?
Clearly, a complexity framework where heterogeneous resources are combined in a non-linear way under high uncertainty can be usefully applied to understanding surprises. Yet on some occasions these may be more appropriately understood in terms of convergence than emergence. 'Convergence' denotes the interlinking of multiple dimensions in an abrupt, unplanned manner, where commonalities appear from pre-existing differences. The objective of this article is to demonstrate that the concept of 'convergence' is helpful in portraying the interplay of chance and complexity that is the hallmark of unpredictability (Kauffman, 1995) . To that end, we follow an approach where we first investigate the systemic properties of the focal event (the success of 'Ataka'), establish the extent to which it displays complex behaviour, and then articulate the logic responsible for the pattern of complexity observed. We then elaborate the nature, utility, and level of generalizeability of this logic.
Research Context
The political arena in Bulgaria in the 1990s was dominated on the left by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the successor party to the old Communist Party, and on the right, the Union of Democratic Forces (SDS), a coalition of anti-communist political forces. The space in between was traditionally inhabited by smaller political formations, the most notable of which is the Movement for Rights and Freedom (DPS), representing the country's Turkish minority. Bulgaria has traditionally advocated a model of peaceful ethnic co-existence with its minoritiesTurkish (about 10 per cent of the population) and Roma or Gypsy (6 per cent). The Bulgarian ethnic model of including DPS in almost every postcommunist government is held up as a major democratic achievement. However, the role of DPS as a key government party caused increasing uneasiness within the Bulgarian majority, which became more receptive to nationalist-populist messages of the kind propagated by 'Ataka'. Ataka's rise must be seen in the context of long-term political processes in post-communist Bulgaria. Among the most important trends are the erosion of popular support for the representative institutions and the reinforcement of nationalistic and populist elements in the political rhetoric. Until 2001, Bulgarian politics was polarized between the ex-communist left and anticommunist right, but the growing public discontent with the failures of traditional parties to curb corruption undermined the classic left-right division. The issue of corruption has dominated the public agenda for years. As a result of strong pressure from the European Union new institutions were created to fight corruption, but due to absence of a strong political will, these proved ineffective. Periodic corruption scandals reinforced the public perception of entrenched inability (or unwillingness) to create effective mechanisms of control. The political apathy of voters led to diminishing loyalty to party ideas and principles. Ideology lost its mobilization force and parties deemphasized political programs and ideological coherence, opening the way for the emergence of new political formations seeking to capitalize on the political malaise by vowing to fight corruption and/or drawing on the popular uneasiness about the disproportionate role of the representative of ethnic minorities-the Movement for Rights and Freedom, in the exercise of power. 4 The National Union 'Ataka' was formed through the coalition of several splinter political organizations only 2 months before the general parliamentary elections of 25 June 2005. The new party was led by a collection of individuals, some of whom were newcomers to politics, while many others were former members of SDS, BSP, and other parties. The party's leaders have criticized ethnic minorities for being too 'privileged' and talked about 'Roma terror' against Bulgarians, tolerated by the state. 'Ataka' is opposed to NATO, the Iraq War, and to closer ties with the United States.
The party is not against the European Union membership of Bulgaria, but insists on stronger ties with Russia. It tends towards inflammatory comments that often have their party representatives sidelined by other parties.
The party's programme documents (the '20 Principles' and the 'Program Scheme') display a set of nationalistic features. They define Bulgaria as a onenation state and assert the supremacy of the state and the Bulgarian nation above ethnic and religious diversity. In the past, 'Ataka' named many politicians, human rights, and minority rights activists as 'traitors'. The 'Program Scheme' advocates making the Bulgarian Orthodox Church an official religion in Bulgaria. It also supports the reversal of the privatization of several enterprises of 'national significance'. A much-debated question is whether 'Ataka' is a right-or left-wing party. 'Ataka' functionaries claim that it is 'neither left, nor right, but Bulgarian'. All other parliamentary parties have consistently stated unwillingness for coalition with 'Ataka', seeing it as a threat to the entrenched model of ethnic peace in Bulgaria.
The June 2005 elections resulted in the most fragmented parliament in post-communism. A record number of parties-seven, surpassed the electoral threshold, 5 with 'Ataka' winning 8.1 per cent of the popular vote and 21 out of 240 parliamentary seats (8.8 per cent). Its success has generally been attributed to the failure of post-communist politics to serve the broader public interest. A combination of factors is usually invoked, such as closed, unresponsive and corrupt political elite, a populist political culture, weak democratic traditions, and broad discontent with reforms. These arguments delineate a 'linear' logic of explanation, according to which the buildup of discontent with the political elites is the key precondition for the rise of a successful protest party-the greater the public discontent, the higher the probability of emergence. In this logic, the preference for the party should be highest among the underprivileged and those who experienced status loss in post-communism. Emergence is predictable on the basis of preconditions, while the room for surprise is limited to the timing of emergence, which follows an unknown distribution and is best subsumed within the error term of the regression equation.
This framework expects an unambiguous profile of support for 'Ataka' and uncomplicated, linear dependence between key socio-demographic predictors and the probability of support. On the contrary, a framework of unpredictability harbours the expectation of non-linear ambiguity rather than linear clarity. Emergence here is highly problematic-the rising public discontent is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a successful protest party. It is a combination of logics rather than a dominant logic that serves as the catalyst for emergence. This leads to an expectation of heterogeneity of the vote and non-linear interdependencies between key socio-demographic variables and the probability of an 'Ataka' vote. If 'Ataka''s rise was indeed difficult to foresee, the analysis should find no core pattern in the profile of supporters, revealing a complex system with a number of underlying dimensions brought together in a 'convergent' manner. To sum, unpredictability manifests itself through heterogeneity, with components that do not naturally belong together, interwoven by means of non-linear interdependencies in a temporal pattern that suggests a lack of strategic oversight.
Data and Variables
To test these expectations we draw on three sources of data. The main one is a large-sample survey of political preferences, the second one documents patterns of online search, and the third one tracks newspaper coverage. The survey uses a multi-stage, randomprobability sample of 1017 respondents, stratified regionally and within regions, according to rural/ urban divisions and settlement size. Within the primary sampling units, individual respondents were chosen on the basis of standard random procedures. Data were collected through face-to-face interviews in January 2006, roughly 6 months after the elections. The survey questions cover a wide range of topics, including occupational history, expectations for the future, satisfaction with the past and present, participation in collective action, political preferences, lifestyle choices, social relationships, and many others.
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Descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis are presented in Table 1 . The basic socio-demographic battery includes age, gender, settlement size, education, and income. Gender is a dummy variable with 'Male' ¼ 1, settlement size (or place of residence) is measured on a decreasing 4-point scale, where 1 is the capital, Sofia, and 4 is a village. Education is measured on a 5-point scale where 1 marks the lowest level and 5 the highest, post-graduate level of education. Income is measured on an increasing 6-point scale, where 6 marks the highest income bracket.
7 To these, we added a diverse set of variables intended to capture the extent of heterogeneity of the support base of 'Ataka'. The use of some of them, such as relative standing and social integration, has been suggested by recent studies in the Bulgarian context (see Sgourev, 2006) . Relative standing is measured through the following survey item: 'Let us imagine the social positions that people in Bulgaria occupy on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is the highest. Where would you put yourself in this range?'. The social integration item is: 'On a scale of 1 (''No Trust'') to 10 (''Full Trust'') how would you characterize the level of trust you have in your friends or those you consider close to you?'. A visibly flawed measure of integration, this is the only survey item that enables capturing, however roughly, properties of the personal social network. Three indicators measure attitudes typically linked to nationalist-populist parties, such as a desire for radical political change 8 and apprehension of foreigners and minorities. 9 We also include two dummy variables capturing negative personal experiences, such as a failed business venture and victimhood of robbery, to establish the extent to which the 'Ataka' preference is based on personal rather than general themes of discontent. Finally, we include an indicator for exposure ('watching' or not) to the main propaganda tool of 'Ataka'-the 'Skat' TV channel, to ensure the observed effects are not a mere echo of media propaganda. 10 Note that the apparent incoherence of this motley set of variables is intentionally pursued-the objective is to establish whether 'Ataka' represents an internally consistent mixture of protest themes or a hodgepodge of loosely related grievances. To that end, we utilize a wide range of variables that seem to have little in common with each other, in an attempt to capture dimensions of preference for 'Ataka' that are situated orthogonally to each other.
The dependent variable in the analysis is a discrete indicator for the intention to vote for 'Ataka' at the next elections versus preference for another party. However, is it appropriate to make inferences about the profile of 'Ataka's' electoral support based on data 6 months past the elections? To ensure the time lag is not interfering with our conclusions we compared the distributions of the key socio-demographic variables from the survey with the ones from the exit polls on the day of the elections.
11 Regarding education, age, gender, and settlement size, the profile of support for the party is remarkably consistent over the 6 month period. Moreover, the proportion of respondents with a preference for 'Ataka' matches closely the real share of votes earned by the party at the elections. These facts reinforce the belief that the slight temporal lag is neither misrepresenting the profile of the supporters of the party nor substantively affecting the results.
Results
Given the discrete nature of the outcome, the coefficients are estimated in a logistic regression. The results are presented in Table 2 . The first model features a socio-demographic battery, including age, income, level of education, settlement size, and gender. Remarkably, only gender seems to influence the odds of voting for Ataka.
12 Additional analyses, not presented here, 13 reveal that all these variables work well in explaining the preference for traditional parties with a clear left or right political identity. The paucity of significant effects here means either that there is little to separate supporters from non-supporters or that, in line with a framework of complexity, the effects deviate from linearity. To test these possibilities we introduce proxies for personal experience and attitudes as well as the squared terms for all continuous variables in Model 1. The results in the second model attest to the predictive power of perceived status ('relative standing')-the higher one places oneself in the social order, the lower the probability of voting for 'Ataka', other things being equal.
Adding the squared terms in Model 3 produces no substantive changes to the effects of age and settlement size, but the coefficients for the other four measures reach significance. It appears that the odds of voting for 'Ataka' are similar for opposite ends of the educational and income scales, as illustrated on Figure 1 . Those in the middle are most likely to vote for 'Ataka', with the probability falling as the levels of income and education rise. But most surprisingly, the probability of low-income and poorly educated respondents to vote for 'Ataka' is relatively low, suggesting that 'Ataka''s rise is ill-defined as a 'revolt of the poor', as popular accounts do. Rather, 'Ataka' appears as more of a middle-status phenomenon, driven to an extent by frustration with limited mobility and the increasing distance from those higher up on the income scale.
The complicated nature of the 'Ataka' vote is confirmed by the effects of relative standing and 'degree of closeness', presented in Figure 2 . Those who put themselves in the middle of the social order are much less likely to vote for 'Ataka' than those who identify themselves as low or high on it.
14 A similar curve describes the effect of 'degree of closeness'-those who feel either strongly or weakly integrated in their social network are much more likely to express a preference for 'Ataka' than those who place themselves in the middle of that scale.
These results lend support to the expectation of heterogeneity and non-linearity in the electoral profile of 'Ataka'. The probability of voting for it is similar for opposite ends of the spectrum, such as high and low income, high and low education, high and low selfesteem, and high and low integration. 'Ataka' seems to unite distinct groups in a way that resists easy categorization. To further gauge the extent of heterogeneity, the next models add measures of personal attitudes and experiences. In Model 4 the inclusion of three attitudinal variables leads to the disappearance of three of the four non-linear effects, suggesting that attitudes, such as desire for radical political change and anti-minority bias, are what bridges over the socioeconomic differences. 15 Model 5 adds indicators for personal experience-whether the respondent was a victim of robbery or had a business venture fail-to capture the degree to which the preference for 'Ataka' is built on purely personal bases. Both coefficients are significant at the accepted levels. Model 6 adds the proxy for exposure to the main propaganda tool of 'Ataka'-the 'Skat' TV channel. While the effect is positive and significant, it is unable to explain away the dependencies established so far.
For further insights into the extent of heterogeneity of 'Ataka', we ran a principal component analysis of key predictors from the regression analysis. Five main factors (or 'rationales') of 'Ataka' preference emerge, summarized in Table 3 . What looms largest in the first rationale is victimhood of robbery, while the second rationale is anchored in low self-esteem and weak social integration. The third rationale builds on the desire for radical change in the political system. Note that this rationale is not a reflection of a 'loser' mindset-on the contrary, it is correlated with high self-esteem. The fourth rationale revolves around personal grievances and particularly, the disappointment of a failed business enterprise. Anti-minority sentiments stand at the heart of the last rationale, which is the only one with an unequivocal nationalist tinge. The correlations between the rationales tend to be low, 16 with none of them exceeding 0.3, confirming that the 'Ataka' vote is highly heterogeneous-there seems to be no overarching logic governing the preference for 'Ataka'. Rather, different voters see different things in the same entity, extending support for reasons overlapping only partly with those of fellow supporters.
The Temporal Dimension
In line with the 'unpredictability' framework, the analyses reveal a high level of complexity of the electoral profile of 'Ataka'. 'Ataka''s success resulted from the combination of diverse interests and identities in a manner deviating from a linear pattern. Yet, to figure out how the combination occurred, one needs to trace the buildup of support in the preelection period. Unfortunately, there are no direct data available to that end. 17 This constraint can be partly remedied through indirect information sources that can shed some light on the dynamics of support for 'Ataka' in the weeks just before the elections. To that end we use 'Google Trends', a service offered by 'Google' that makes it possible to find overarching trends in online search. It does so by analyzing a portion of Google web searches to compute how many searches have been done for the terms one enters relative to the total number of searches on Google over time. One can restrict results to a particular time frame or region (e.g. search of the word 'Ataka' in May 2005). The results are plotted on a linear scale and presented as a search-volume graph. The graphs are based on aggregated data from millions of Google searches over time.
The pattern of searches of the word 'Ataka', presented on supplementary Figure 1 , reveals an explosion of interest in the period right before the elections, followed by an equally precipitous loss of interest. The spiked shape is nearly identical to that of other brief, intense events, such as hurricane Katrina (the word 'katrina') and the 2005 riots in suburban Paris (the word 'banlieue'), 18 but is uncharacteristic of the online world more generally. Consider the pattern of searches of 'Google Trends' itself, shown on Supplementary Figure 2 There is an explosion of interest exactly 2 days before the elections that is by all means over by the third post-election day. That such a steep loss of interest is far from typical in the political area can easily be established by, for example, examining the pattern of searches for parties of similar political orientation to 'Ataka', such as the Polish 'Samoobrona', or the Romanian 'PRM'. Figures not presented here, but available upon request, show both parties maintaining a stable volume of online searches over time. The spiked shape of the 'Ataka' searches implicates the operation of a virus mechanism, which quickly activates the interest of many people, but just as quickly dissipates. For more evidence on the observed temporal pattern we turn to a more traditional source of informationnewspaper coverage. For consistency, we follow a major Bulgarian daily-'Dnevnik', over the 2 month period leading up the elections. 19 The reason to pick 'Dnevnik' is that it is a business-oriented publication with an independent political stance. Figure 3 presents the daily count of articles mentioning 'Ataka' from 1 June to 28 June. Remarkably, the first time that 'Ataka' is featured is only 20 days before the elections, with the results of a poll giving it between 1.6 and 2.4 per cent of the votes. The coverage of the party gradually increases over time, but altogether, only 22 articles mention 'Ataka' over that 20-day period. The most noteworthy entry is from 2 days before the elections, reporting that the most recent polls gauge 'Ataka''s share of the vote at about 3.5-4.3 per cent. Even allowing for a significant margin of error and possible underreporting of results, the doubling of 'Ataka''s score in just 2 days suggests massive last-minute realignment of political preferences that propelled the party well past what could have been anticipated of a political upstart.
Against this background, the dramatic increase in online queries of 'Ataka' 2 days before the elections, observed on Supplementary Figure 3 , appears to reflect the sudden pique of public interest in the wake of reports placing the party around the threshold of parliamentary representation. The credibility that the last poll accorded to a relatively unknown party (as evidenced by the poor newspaper coverage), is the probable trigger of the last-minute scramble for information, captured in the online search data. One can imagine that the quest for information by Googling gave way to sharing the findings by e-mailing and text-ing one's friends, thereby accelerating diffusion. The evidence shown in Supplementary Figure 3 and Figure 3 suggests that the dramatic upsurge of support on the eve of the vote was unscripted, a product of a broad, anti-establishment message and a confluence of factors that helped transmit the message widely, linking preferences that had heretofore stood apart.
Discussion
Sociological research has shown that complexity, in the form of heterogeneity of organizing principles, can be a valuable resource (Padgett and Ansell, 1993; Stark, 1996) . The meteoric rise of 'Ataka' illustrates aptly how heterogeneity and ambiguity can effectuate change in a profound, but little-expected manner. With ambiguity over the true nature of a political upstart, groups with little in common hitched their grievances onto a bandwagon. What enabled the latter to bridge over a set of ideological and social differences is the principle of 'multivocality' (Padgett and Ansell, 1993) , with different constituents seeing different things in the same object. Of course, linking groups, separated along ideological, social, and geographic lines, by means of a multilayered message is the 'holy grail' of political marketing. However, in a fragmented political field where parties habitually pursue competitive advantage with the broadest possible message, the heterogeneity of the message and its target audience are insufficient to confer lasting advantage. To successfully harness the opportunities for linking that inhere in heterogeneity requires a complicated balancing act between constituents with divergent interests and demands. Past research has shown two ways in which this can be achieved-through skilful strategic manoeuvring (Burt, 1992; Stark, 1996) or through opportunistic linking, where no clear roadmap for brokerage exists (Padgett and Ansell, 1993) .
In the first scenario, 'Ataka''s rise can be attributed to the blurring and bridging of political boundaries by skilful political entrepreneurs. The ambiguity surrounding the party is strategically exploited to knit together diverse protest rationales, surmounting ideological boundaries in the pursuit of gain. However, the evidence points towards considerably less foresight in the process than implied by a scenario requiring the exercise of ample brokerage skills over time. Harnessing the differences among political constituencies takes time and effort to build the credibility that would allow successful brokerage (Burt, 1992) . That this could have been achieved over a period of time as short as a few weeks is highly unlikely, given the typical set of constraints confronted by political upstarts, such as insufficient funding, a small-scale campaign, limited public awareness, and scant media presence.
Critically, a strategy of this kind harbours a relatively straightforward logic of brokerage among disconnected actors, which would have made 'Ataka''s rise more predictable, its political rivals more vigilant, and the target audience more suspicious of the messenger, thereby reducing the probability of a bandwagon. In fact, the absence of a clear strategy may facilitate the explosion of support by lending initial credibility to an upstart with no track record. The analyses revealed a set of distinct rationales for supporting 'Ataka', making up a highly complex and heterogeneous support base that would have been difficult to generate by design, especially under such severe time constraints. This conclusion is reinforced by the spiked shape of online searches, showing little sign of strategic brand-building.
In a scenario that downplays strategic oversight (Padgett and Ansell, 1993 ) 'Ataka' emerges as an amalgam of grievances woven together via opportunistic linking under high uncertainty. The logic whereby disconnected, even antagonistic, political actors are opportunistically and rather fortuitously brought together to further the political agenda of a third party, is well suited to explaining 'Ataka' as concatenation of multiple logics-of-discontent. But what sets this case apart is the speed at which the concatenation occurred-while the Medici faction expanded gradually as a constellation of diverse interests, 'Ataka''s hallmark is the lightning speed at which this constellation occurred. The abrupt, explosive, seemingly haphazard manner of occurrence displays a set of substantive differences with both frameworks and is better categorized as a distinct combinatory logic of 'sudden convergence'.
Sudden Convergence-'Brassage' rather than 'Bricolage'
The significance of the principle of 'sudden convergence', as illustrated by 'Ataka''s rise, is in illuminating how latent differences may unexpectedly come together, reconstructing the social landscape in an instant. Yet, derived from a particular case, to what extent is this principle defined by contextual idiosyncrasies? Are there similar manifestations of 'convergence' both within and outside the collective action domain? One can tentatively view as such an example the 2005 riots in suburban Paris, triggered by the accidental death of two teenagers on the run from the police and escalating to a degree that severely challenged the authorities. Their most notable features were the speed with which they spread across neighbourhoods and the apparent lack of central coordination. Contrary to mass media accounts, an ethnographic study found that the riots were neither planned nor orchestrated-in fact, riot activity was surprisingly decentralized, mediated through little more than imitation of other rioters in adjacent neighbourhoods (Roché, 2006) . Rioting spread from one cluster or neighbourhood to another, but what bridged these were not pre-existing social ties, as past research suggests (cf. Gould, 1991) , but mutual observation and imitation between distinctive groups. The analysis asserts that the social fragmentation of the immigrant-populated banlieues around Paris is what prevented the rioters from mounting an even more sustained challenge to the authorities, as their efforts at one-upmanship lacked the necessary coordination for that purpose.
A common thread through the 'Ataka' and Paris cases is the sudden outburst of support for a vague protest agenda, tentatively unifying a disjointed, heterogeneous set of actors into a loose and fragile coalition of interests. This mode of momentary convergence can be metaphorically described with the French word 'brassage' ('mixing') to accentuate its difference from 'bricolage', with its strategic overtones. 'Brassage' connotes a melting pot of distinct, perhaps even contradictory tastes, interests, and relationships, mixed together by means of social interaction or mutual observation. 20 What are the general conditions favouring the convergence of differences into such a mixture? The world of postcommunism and that of the immigrant banlieue have in common the combination of relative deprivation and social fragmentation. The sense of deprivation is a very powerful motivator of protest activity (Taylor, 1982) . It originates from status loss, downward mobility, dashed expectations or any other form of unfulfilled potential. The experience of relative deprivation, widespread in the post-communist world (see Sgourev, 2006 Sgourev, , p. 1501 , reduces resistance to populist messages promising to upend the status-quo and rectify the source of experienced grievances. This observation is in broad agreement with the breakdown theory of collective action (cf. Oberschall, 1973) , according to which mass protests are the vehicle through which those seeing themselves as dispossessed or disconnected from society vent their discontent.
Social breakdown generates personal losses, which are experienced as highly salient deprivations (on lossaversion see Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) undercutting actors' confidence that their expectations will ultimately be fulfilled. It is the conjuncture of deprivations and an uncertain future that gives rise to anger, indignation and protest (Useem, 1998, p. 227) .
While broad-scale experience of relative deprivation is a necessary condition for the 'sudden convergence' of differentiated protest logics, it is by no means a sufficient one. Our analyses suggest that the explosive nature of the process results from the interaction of relative deprivation and social fragmentation. The uncertainty created by the breakdown of socialist regimes led to the weakening of collective trust and deepening social fragmentation, reflected in the contraction of friendship networks and increasing reliance on familial ones (see Angelusz and Tardos, 2001 ).
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The experience of relative deprivation accelerated this process by reinforcing in-group identification and in-group biases (Hogg and Mullin, 1999) . When people increasingly turn to proximate others for help in navigating difficult times, niches of similarity emerge in social space (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001) , with their distinct set of grievances that can be exploited through ambiguous messages with broader appeal, capable of bridging over diverse sources of discontent.
It is important to underline that a structural landscape characterized by tightly knit clusters with few ties between them is a configuration conducive to short-term, large-scale contagion, as the virus can jump from one cluster to another, with strong ties serving to disseminate and extend the message (Friedkin, 1998) . Indirect support is provided by the established non-linear effect of social integration ('trust in one's contacts') on the odds of voting for 'Ataka' (Figure 2) . The odds are greatest at low and high levels of integration, meaning that under-and over-integration are conducive to bandwagons. That social fragmentation creates preconditions for 'sudden convergence' is hinted at by Oberschall (1973, pp. 122-123) who contends that when horizontal ties in a community are weak or non-existent, one should expect 'short-lived, but violent outbursts devoid of leadership, organization, and explicitly articulated goals'. Such manifestations are not political in nature (Useem, 1998, p. 235) even when a political agenda is layered on top of them.
Naturally, elaborating the preconditions for 'sudden convergence' requires comparison of occurrences across diverse settings and the present endeavour is only an initial step in this direction. It is unclear to what extent the context of a struggling postcommunist country, characterized by rising inequality, widespread discontent and an entrenched tendency for status-devaluation (Sgourev, 2006) , affects the findings. Yet, as suggested by the French riots, the process is not confined within country lines. There are also good reasons to think that 'sudden convergence' transcends the political field. Consider the 'subprime crisis' that roiled the financial and housing markets starting in August 2007. The crisis had many dimensions to it and has been examined from multiple angles, but it arguably boiled down to the followingparts of the system that were not supposed to be correlated, suddenly became so. According to Khandani and Lo (2007) and Lo (2008) , the trigger of this crisis was the sudden liquidation of similar investment portfolios, so that parts of the portfolios that were previously uncorrelated fell in tandem, putting pressure on a much broader swath of the market. The increasing heterogeneity of contemporary financial markets and the complexity of their interface served as the preconditions for the crisis, but the immediate trigger was 'incidental' in nature-a conclusion that resonates with our findings in the 'Ataka' case.
While political movements and financial markets have little substantive overlap, one can find similarities in the ways in which pre-existing differences converged. One is speed-the abrupt manner in which previously unobserved correlations emerged. But it is, arguably, the fragmentation of each context that made such speed possible. Apart from the post-communist fragmentation discussed above, one can also point to the increasingly fragmented financial markets, marked by high uncertainty about asset flows. Due to the massive growth of financial markets and the proliferation of novel financial instruments, sliced and traded in many parts, there is substantial uncertainty about the trajectories of financial flows-about who owns what-with strategies devised in poor knowledge of the size of risk taken (Khandani and Lo, 2007) . The lack of clarity on the distribution of assets (or attitudes) in a larger population reinforces individual 'myopia', facilitating the convergence of differences in ways that are not predictable based on actors' preferences or on past events.
Postulating 'sudden convergence' as a distinct social mechanism, with its own substantive logic, requires the clarification of the extent to which it differs from past accounts. A key point of reference in explaining sudden eruptions of mass protest is Kuran's (1991 Kuran's ( , 1995 argument, resting on widespread grievances that have long remained unexpressed. Surprises occur when unforeseen, random events trigger a cascadethe long suppressed resentment bursts out and vocal protest feeds on itself. A combination of non-linearity and imperfect information uncorks latent discontent. In the 'Ataka' case non-linearity and information shortages play a role too, but the mechanism is different-here groups with distinct grievances come to participate in an impromptu alliance. If the activating mechanism in the former case is the visibility of others' discontent, it is the lack of visibility in the latter that permits actors to latch onto different features of the same entity. Ambiguity is critical in achieving this 'kaleidoscopic' effect, whereby diverse preferences are enmeshed. This process was defined as 'brassage' to differentiate it from the strategically oriented action pattern of 'brokerage'.
The insistence on the spontaneous, unorchestrated nature of this process is in agreement with Padgett and Ansell's (1993) framework as well as with a research stream in political science viewing protest as spontaneous and unpredictable, with manifestations that are temporary, short-lived, and discontinuous in nature (Smelser, 1963; Klapp, 1972) . This framework views the 'precipitants' of mass protest as dominating the 'preconditions' (Eckstein, 1965) , with situational and highly specific forces shaping protest, as shown by Lichbach (1985) . It should be underlined that this framework does not deny the significance of latent, long-term processes in producing outcomes along the lines featured here; as our analysis suggests, the fragmentation of the post-communist Bulgarian society and the kaleidoscopic richness of sources of grievance are key preconditions for political tremors of this kind. Such events cannot be seen as random in nature, as they capitalize on underlying social processes, but the manner in which the processes interacted to enable or precipitate the rise of 'Ataka' were highly complex and unpredictable. Thus, the main contribution of this article is in clarifying a mechanism of 'precipitation', whereby long-standing preconditions for protest were abruptly linked and activated.
While providing evidence for 'white noise' in mass protest (Lichbach, 1985) , the process of 'sudden convergence' is not reducible to the accidental nature and lack of organization attributed to mob activity (cf. Klapp, 1972) . Rather, it emanates from a fragmented structure dominated by small disconnected clusters that enable the alignment of cluster-specific grievances in temporary coalitions under ambiguity. The extent to which the combination of chance and complexity underlying 'sudden convergence' can be recognized as a general principle depends on the ability to collect supporting evidence in other contexts and apply this logic to events of similarly explosive nature. The reviewed cases are suggestive of broader generalizeability than our research context, but its scope can only be established by systematically targeting displays of unpredictability in other domains and countries. Another avenue for future research is longitudinal in nature, tracking the evolution of 'Ataka' and the changes to its composition over time. As of a few years later, the party maintains a solid presence in Bulgarian political life, attracting a similar proportion of votes to the one in 2005. It remains unclear whether this stability is due more to the emergence of a core of committed supporters or to a dynamic whereby collective frustration is periodically vented in support for the party. Anecdotal data suggest both processes are at play, with the party upholding a presence as a dissenting formation, cemented by means of the skilful, non-committal manoeuvring of its leader between multifarious protest themes.
Given the sociological inclination to pursue order in all walks of social life, it is instrumental to guard against overcausation by periodically reassessing the role attributed to chance in our theories. There is every reason to believe that as a result of deepening social fissures in once compact societies, spontaneous processes of the kind shown here are becoming more pervasive over time. A fragmented modern world, with continuously fractured cultural and class identities, represents an inviting stage for sudden, unscripted combinations of the kind illustrated by 'Ataka'. It is a core sociological tenet that the forces of differentiation and integration are intertwined and that their balance is always unstable and provisional, giving rise to improvisational blending in the form of fashion trends (Simmel, 1957) Rao's (1998) analysis of the rise of the non-profit consumer watchdog organization or in the research tradition associated most strongly with the work of Burt (1992) . Yet bricolage is not reducible to brokerage, because recombination pursues the end of hedging against uncertainty, rather than capitalizing on extant structural holes. Hence, the former is the more appropriate principle to draw on in articulating the combinatory logic of (un)predictability. We recoded the original scale of the educationlevel variable into years of education and the income categories into a continuous scale (in the local currency-'lev'), but no substantive differences in the results were found. Therefore, we prefer to maintain the original coding of the variables, as it allows for the presentation of results for education and income on the same graph (Figure 2 ). 8. A dummy variable, the question is worded as:
'Do you think the way in which the politicaladministrative system is organized needs radical change?' 9. Given the sensitive nature of the issue of one's attitudes towards minorities, the survey avoided asking direct questions. Hence, we had to construct indirect measures based on one of the very few items that touch on the subject. The question is 'Are there people in Bulgaria who earn more than they deserve?' and the response list includes the categories of 'Turks' and 'Roma', next to 'businessmen', 'police officers', 'medical doctors', and a few others. Notwithstanding the heterogeneous response list, the question does provide an opportunity to tap into latent attitudes towards minorities. Yet it clearly works better for Roma than Turks in view of the very high unemployment rate among Roma and their dependence on public assistance. This issue is addressed in more depth in the discussion section. The 'anti-foreign' question is 'Would you agree with the statement-''It is good that Bulgaria is opening up and many foreigners are starting to settle down here'' ', with a binary response scale. 10. 'Skat' TV is a national cable channel that carries the syndicated show of the leader of 'Ataka'-Volen Siderov, and is regarded as an informational source with an ingrained nationalistic stance. The channel began broadcasting in 1992.
Its nationalistic orientation was reinforced in 2005 through collaboration with 'Ataka'. 11. The exit polls were obtained from 'Alpha
Research'-the same agency that conducted the survey used here. 12. All of the variables were first entered separately.
The results are very similar to the ones presented in Model 1. 13. These are available from the author upon request. 14. The discrepancy between the curves for objective and subjective status is not unexpected, given the difficulties of establishing social status in postcommunism (with lower correlation between education and income than in the Western European countries), but, more importantly, because of the very significant misalignment between subjective and objective social standing, documented by Sgourev (2006) in the Bulgarian context. 15. A brief note is in order on the effect of the antiTurk measure mentioned in Footnote 9, but omitted here. The reason is the very few positive answers (only 42 out of 1017) that make this an unreliable measure of anti-Turk sentiment. When added to the controls in Model 1 it reaches significance at the .05 level, but loses it when the anti-Roma measure is added, which is by far the strongest predictor of the three 'anti-' measures. This hints that anti-Roma is the stronger electoral sentiment, but requires additional research and is outside our research scope. 16. The table of correlations between the components from the PCA analysis is available upon request. 17. The preferable source of data on the pre-election buildup of support would be weekly public opinion surveys. However, these turned out to be much less informative than expected. Ironically, the very suddenness of Ataka's rise impeded its proper documentation. The sociological agency we contacted acknowledged its unawareness of the latent rise in support for Ataka, only putting it as a listed option for respondents to choose from a week to 10 days before the elections. This was in response to several interviewers noting that respondents were mentioning a new party that they had not heard of. Up until then, the preference for Ataka had been coded simply as 'other', and therefore, inappropriate for analysis. It is for this reason that we are using Internet and newspapers searches. 18. The 'Katrina' and 'Banlieue' figures are available from the author upon request. 19. Archival access to 'Dnevnik' is available through the Dow Jones' Factiva database. 'Dnevnik' is published from Monday to Friday. The weekends are, therefore, excluded from the article count in Figure 2 . 20. An anonymous reviewer suggested as another example of this process the anti-globalization protests at the IMF, World Bank, WTO and Davos meetings, encompassing socialists, gays and lesbians, animal rights and global warming activists, anti-trade groups, feminists, and others. The manner in which a coalition of separate fragments (Green and Griffith, 2002, p. 54) coalesced within a framework of a lack of a centralized organization (Brooks, 2004) and managed to hold the public attention for days in a row, is akin to the rise of 'Ataka'. The extent to which these similarities reveal substantive overlap in the activating mechanism is, however, far from clear, and represents an appropriate topic for future research. 21. Confronted with the uncertainty of reforms, people in post-communist societies increasingly relied on familial and friendship networks for assistance and support (Sik and Wellman, 1999, p. 225) . The uncertainty of abrupt institutional changes encourages the reconfiguration of networks in a manner that minimizes distances within cliques, but increases distances between cliques, leading to social fragmentation (Sgourev, 2006 (Sgourev, , pp. 1512 (Sgourev, -1513 .
